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From Law and order to PaciFication: 
Britain’s suPPression oF the araB 
revoLt in PaLestine, 1936–39
Matthew hughes
This article examines British human rights abuses against noncom-
batants during the 1936–39 Arab Revolt in Palestine, contextualizing 
brutality in Palestine within British military practice and law for 
dealing with colonial rebellions in force at the time. It shows that 
the norms for such operations, and the laws that codified military 
actions, allowed for some level of systemic, systematic brutality in the 
form of “collective punishments” and “reprisals” by the British army. 
The article also details the effects of military actions on Palestinian 
civilians and rebels and describes torture carried out by the British 
on Palestinians. Finally, it highlights a methodological problem in 
examining these sorts of abuses: the paucity of official records and the 
mismatch between official and unofficial accounts of abuse during 
counterinsurgency.
In aprIl 1936, the Palestinians launched a countrywide revolt against British 
rule in Mandatory Palestine and the official policy of support for Jewish immi-
gration to the country. While interrupted by a cease-fire from October 1936 
to September 1937, the rebellion reached its peak of intensity in 1938, before 
petering out in mid- to late 1939 with the approaching war in Europe. For 
long stretches of the rebellion, the British lost control of Palestine, including 
many major towns and, for about five days in October 1938, the Old City of 
Jerusalem. This was a substantial colonial revolt requiring a remarkably large 
force deployment by Britain: two full infantry divisions, or some twenty-five 
thousand men, with supporting arms by 1938. Most British infantry regiments 
served in Palestine at one time or another between 1936 and 1939.
The severity of the rebellion, along with a shortage of troops in Palestine 
when it erupted, limited Britain’s initial response. By the time regiments were 
en route to Palestine and the army was ready for protracted military action 
in autumn 1936, a royal commission of inquiry led by Lord Peel was on its 
way to the country to investigate the causes of the revolt and determine the 
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territory’s future, resulting in a temporary suspension of guerrilla activity. The 
commission’s failure, and notably the publication in summer 1937 of its report 
recommending the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, triggered 
a sharp recrudescence of the rebellion by early autumn. Though the British 
army had ramped up its repression as of October 1937, at the same time 
increasingly taking charge from the police and civil authorities, the need to 
hold back troops for a possible European war restricted what it could do. The 
Munich settlement in September 1938 freed it from this constraint, enabling 
it to send strong reinforcements to Palestine. Beginning in October 1938, 
British troops started to flood the country, making possible the tough, exten-
sive repression in the field that eventually defeated the rebellion. The influx 
of troops and the gradual introduction of military courts and forms of martial 
law as of autumn 1937 boosted the army’s position, and ordinary Palestinians 
would feel the brunt of Britain’s military power.
Law and order
Britain had long experience with colonial rebellions and had practical tra-
ditions and legal systems in place to deal with them. As far back as 1896, an 
influential volume by Colonel C. E. Callwell titled Small Wars: Their Principles 
and Practice described counterinsurgency methods from places such as the 
northwest frontier of India that would later be employed in Palestine:
The adoption of guerrilla methods by the enemy almost neces-
sarily forces the regular troops to resort to punitive measures 
directed against the possessions of their antagonists. It must be 
remembered that one way to get the enemy to fight is to make 
raids on his property—only the most cowardly of savages and 
irregulars will allow their cattle to be carried off or their houses 
to be destroyed without making some show of resistance. . . . [I]t 
has generally been found very useful to send raiding parties con-
sisting of mounted men great distances to carry off the enemy 
flocks and herds or to destroy encampments and villages.1
While concentrating on the military tactics to be used against local rebels, 
Callwell also provided details on how to deal with the civilian population who, 
as “uncivilised races attribute leniency to timidity,” must be “thoroughly brought 
to book and cowed or they will rise again.”2 Collective punitive measures such 
as “destroying villages, carrying off livestock and trampling down crops and so 
on,” already well established in irregular “small” wars against guerrillas by the 
time Callwell wrote his book, were used in the Boer War (1899–1902), during 
the Egyptian and Iraqi revolts (1919–20), in India, and during the Irish War of 
Independence (1919–21).3 In the 1930s, Major General Sir Charles Gwynn 
and Colonel H. J. Simson—the latter served in Palestine during the revolt—
developed Callwell’s lessons, applying them to imperial hot spots such as 
Palestine and arguing that such situations required firm military rule.4
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The British military legal system supported harsh measures by troops fight-
ing insurgents, especially those operating outside the United Kingdom. Soldiers 
in Palestine were bound by the King’s Regulations (reissued in 1935 with a 
section titled “Duties in Aid of the Civil Power” that largely related to troops’ 
conduct in the United Kingdom) and the 1929 Manual of Military Law, a bulky 
hardback volume whose key points were abridged in pocket-sized pamphlets 
such as Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934 and the 1937 Duties in the Aid of the 
Civil Power that officers could take with them on operations.5 The 1929 manual, 
an updated compilation of periodically reissued manuals of law stretching back 
to 1884, forbade stealing from and maltreating civilians. It also made clear that 
soldiers were subject to civil as well as military law and that an “act which 
constitutes an offence if committed by a civilian is none the less an offence if 
committed by a soldier.”6
That said, the manual also established a legal framework for shooting rioters 
and allowed for “collective punishments” and “retribution,” whose loose definitions 
gave field commanders considerable leeway in interpreting the rules. The 1929 
law clearly stated that where coercion was required or where terrorism needed to 
be checked, collective punishment and reprisals that would “inflict suffering upon 
innocent individuals,” were “indispensable as a last resource.”7 According to the 
law, “The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree 
of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection.”8
Strictly speaking, the 1929 manual applied these punitive laws only to civilians 
living under military occupation during wartime. In the case of Palestine, the mili-
tary rule imposed by Britain in 1917 was lifted in 1920 with the establishment 
in the country of a civil government, but collective punishment was explicitly 
permitted under the Ordinances and Orders in Council introduced in Palestine 
by the Mandate authorities in 1922 and regularly updated thereafter. Indeed, 
a “Collective Responsibility for Crime Ordinance” dates 
back to 1921.9 The British used these local laws when 
implementing collective punishments on Palestinians 
and villages, referring to them after April 1936 as “emer-
gency” laws. The 1934 and 1937 pamphlets cited above 
provide further proof that the principles (and practice) 
of collective punishment and reprisals were an estab-
lished part of rule and repression in Palestine.
Civil proceedings against servicemen for individual offenses during coun-
terinsurgency operations were theoretically possible, but a strict reading of 
the military law in force meant that in practice soldiers had little reason to 
fear disciplinary action for most excesses, including theft, torture, and assault. 
Victims could take out civil proceedings only against individual soldiers (the 
state being immune from prosecution until the 1947 Crown Proceedings Act), 
and even then, it had to be proven that the soldiers were acting beyond their 
lawful operational orders. This was not practicable. One Palestinian claimed that 
soldier “number 65” had beaten him, not realizing that all the men from that unit, 
the York and Lancaster Regiment (formerly the 65th Foot), carried this number 
The principles (and 
practice) of collective 
punishment and reprisals 
were an established part 
of rule and repression 
in Palestine.
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on the left side of their helmets.10 This author has found only one successful 
prosecution of servicemen in Palestine—that of four British police officers who 
blatantly executed an Arab prisoner in a street in Jaffa. The case was prosecuted 
only because a number of non-British European residents witnessed the inci-
dent and complained. (The complaints of Arabs never resulted in a prosecution.) 
The killing led to an investigation and the charging of the four officers who 
received minimal sentences, reduced on appeal.11
After September 1936, the army established military courts and regulations 
in Palestine that were separate from the ordinary civil courts and not open to 
the usual legal challenges. The shift from a civil to a military judiciary was partial 
and gradual, but the general effect was that legal appeals by Arabs would either 
fail or not be allowed.12 While British forces in Palestine during the revolt offi-
cially operated as an aid to the civil power, conditions in the country in practice 
approached martial law, a situation that further eased civil limits on soldiers’ 
behavior. The British never instituted full (or “real”) martial law in Palestine, but 
in a series of Orders in Council and emergency regulations after 1936 they issued 
“statutory” martial law, a level between semimilitary rule under civil powers and 
full martial law under military powers where the army and not the civil high 
commissioner had the upper hand.13 After September 1937, when the rebellion 
intensified, the army increasingly took charge in Palestine, with the “full power 
of search and arrest, independent of the police, and the right to shoot and kill 
any man attempting to escape search or ignoring challenges.”14
Thus, starting from late 1937 or early 1938, Palestine was under de facto 
if not de jure martial law of some sort. Nor was military rule much affected 
by the international laws in place at the time (e.g., the succession of Geneva 
conventions from 1864 to 1929 and the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907) 
as these dealt mainly with the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners 
of war (POWs) rather than with the maltreatment of civilians. Britain had clas-
sified the Arab Revolt as an internal insurrection and not an international war, 
thereby denying POW status to captured Arab fighters and allowing them to 
be treated as civilian criminals subject to ordinary civil law modified by condi-
tions of martial law, such as the death penalty for carrying a weapon or ammu-
nition. To be fair, the British never entirely removed civil authority in Palestine 
from the decision-making process, but by 1938, the high commissioner tem-
pered rather than directed the actions of British armed forces. When Sir Arthur 
Wauchope, the high commissioner in place for the first phase of the revolt, 
looked for a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to insti-
tute martial law, he antagonized the armed forces who thought him too lenient 
and referred to him as a “washout” and “ga-ga.”15 In March 1938, the Colonial 
Office replaced him with the more compliant Sir Harold MacMichael.
PaciFication
Britain’s most spectacular single act of destruction in Palestine was the 
demolition of large parts of the old city of Jaffa just two months after the 
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outbreak of the rebellion. Beginning on 16 June 1936 and continuing in sev-
eral phases to the end of the month, the British army, ostensibly to improve 
the sanitation system, cut wide pathways through the old city with large gelig-
nite charges to allow military access to, and control of, a rebel-held area that 
had previously eluded military control.16 In the process, the army blew up 
between 220 and 240 multioccupancy buildings, rendering homeless up to 
6,000 Palestinians, most of whom were left destitute, having been told by air-
dropped leaflets on the morning of 16 June to vacate their homes by 21:00 
hours of the same day.17 Some families were left with nothing, not even a 
change of clothes.18 As a British army intelligence officer observed, “That will 
fucking well teach them.”19 Such vandalism shocked the British chief justice 
in Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell, who frankly condemned the action, for 
which he was dismissed.20 Under strict censorship and therefore unable to 
express outrage at the destruction of the heart of old Jaffa, the Palestinian 
press resorted to irony. Jaffa’s leading newspaper, Filastin (Palestine), reported 
how the “operation of making the city [Jaffa] more beautiful is carried out 
through boxes of dynamite.”21 Al-Difa‘ (the Defense) headlined the assault 
with “Goodbye, goodbye, old Jaffa, the army has exploded you.”22 Many Jaffans, 
now refugees, ended up living in shanty towns, an ironic finale to an action 
officially depicted as an attempt to “improve” health and sanitation.
While the destruction of old Jaffa did not contravene the legal framework 
and principles governing collective punishment discussed in the previous 
section, the “pacification” permitted under these rules easily elided brutality 
and torture and blurred the distinction between official and unofficial punish-
ment. Nor was there a clear division between what constituted “punishment,” 
“reprisal,” or simply a “search,” a looseness facilitated by the leeway given to 
officers in the field and by the fact that British regiments responded differently 
to the stresses of suppressing the revolt. Most often, the widespread use of 
punitive actions and destructive and brutal reprisals stopped short of actual 
atrocity, but such actions were central to British military repression after 1936 
and constituted the core experience for Palestinians during the revolt.
The level of damage varied considerably depending on time, place, and the 
regiment involved, but whatever the law sanctioned, destruction and vandal-
ism were certainly a systematic, systemic part of British counterinsurgency 
operations. The destruction could take the form of blowing up houses—often 
the most impressive ones in the village—or vandalizing and smashing house-
hold effects. Alongside the destruction, servicemen often looted properties, 
though this was not officially sanctioned. There were also “reprisals” in the 
form of heavy collective fines, forced labor, and punitive village occupations 
by government forces for which villagers bore the cost. One Arab rebel noted 
that the British army was unable to “strike” the fighters so it had to resort to 
“revenge” and “collective punishment.”23 Using air support, radio communica-
tions, intelligence, collaborators, and mobile columns, the British improved 
their tactics against the rebel bands, but they never were able to defeat an 
elusive enemy in open battle in rough terrain, so they adopted a two-pronged 
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military approach, targeting enemy fighters and the civilians on whom they 
relied for support.
The June 1936 operation in Jaffa was atypical as troops by and large 
avoided large-scale destruction in the bigger towns, although parts of Jenin 
were destroyed following the assassination of a British colonial official, W. S. S. 
Moffat, in the town in August 1938. Generally, it was the smaller, remote villages 
in rural areas of Palestine that were singled out for incremental devastation. 
Villages that proved particularly recalcitrant would be entirely demolished, 
reduced to “mangled masonry,” as happened to the village of Mi‘ar, north of 
Acre in October 1938.24 On other occasions, the British used sea mines from 
the battleship HMS Malaya to destroy houses.25 Sometimes the charges laid 
were so large that neighboring houses collapsed or flying debris hit bystand-
ers. The laying of oversized explosive charges by Royal Engineers to effect 
maximum damage was intentional. British troops even made Palestinians 
demolish their own houses, brick by brick.26
During army searches, soldiers would surround a village and then detach 
and guard the women and children separately from the men, who were often 
held in wire “cages” during protracted searches. In the meantime, soldiers 
would “search” the empty houses, often destroying everything therein, burn-
ing grain and pouring olive oil over household food and effects.27 The village 
men were also “screened” by having them pass in front of hooded or hidden 
Arab informers who would nod when a “suspect” was found, or by British 
officials checking their papers against lists of suspects. If the army was follow-
ing up an intelligence lead and looking for a suspect or hidden weapons, any 
destruction was incidental to the searching of properties. Troops also used 
primitive metal detectors on such operations.28 The army used the excuse of 
weapons searches to justify damage if there were complaints.
Destruction of property was not part of soldiers’ training, but once prompted 
they did the job with gusto. The officer tasked with checking on a search carried 
out in one village reprimanded a corporal who left intact a beautiful cabinet 
full of glassware, and then proceeded to destroy the cabinet and its contents 
himself.29 The British designated some searches as “punitive.” Recalling such 
raids, a private remarked, “Oh yes, punitive. You smashed wardrobes with plates, 
glass mirrors in[,] and furniture, anything you could see you smashed.”30 The 
local district officer instructed Colonel J. S. S. Gratton, then a subaltern with the 
Hampshire Regiment, that the unit’s search of Safad was a punitive raid, meaning 
that (in Gratton’s words) they could “knock the place about”:
And it’s very alien to a chap like you or me to go in and break 
the chair and kick chatty in with all the oil in and mixed 
it in with the bedclothes and break all the windows and 
everything. You don’t feel like doing it. And I remember the 
adjutant coming in and saying, “You are not doing your stuff. 
They’re perfectly intact all those houses you’ve just searched. 
This is what you’ve got to do.” And he picked up a pick helve 
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and sort of burst everything. I said, “Right OK,” so I got hold 
of the soldiers and said, “this is what you’ve got to do,” you 
know. And I don’t think they liked it much but once they’d 
started on it you couldn’t stop them. And you’d never seen 
such devastation.31
Following the search and cordon of the town of Safad by the Hampshire 
Regiment, a senior police officer in Palestine, Sir Charles Tegart, noted simply 
that the soldiers “did their work thoroughly,” adding that local villagers had 
little sympathy for the townsfolk of Safad, who had hitherto been spared and 
who would now “know what has been happening to us.”32 For the soldiers, 
their job in Palestine was simply “to bash anybody on the head who broke the 
law, and if he didn’t want to be bashed on the head then he had to be shot. It 
may sound brutal but in fact it was a reasonably nice, simple objective and the 
soldiers understood it.”33 Hilda Wilson, a British school teacher in Palestine, 
concluded that the reason for the soldiers’ destructiveness was that they were 
“bored stiff” and had no social amenities, compounded by the alienation that 
they felt serving “in a distant country among people who, they are told, are 
the ‘enemy’.”34
Variations between the “official” history of counter-rebel operations and 
village searches and less formal versions of events suggest a hidden history—
when evidence can be found. The British response to the assassination of two 
Black Watch Regiment soldiers near Jerusalem’s Jaffa Gate on 5 November 
1937 is a case in point. In what would be classed as an “official” account, 
General Sir Archibald Wavell, the overall commander in Palestine, remarked on 
the restraint shown by the Black Watch (coincidentally, his old regiment) on a 
subsequent operation against Silwan, the village south of the city blamed for 
the attack, although he did note that a suspect died “falling over a cliff.”35 In 
Ha’Aretz (the Land) it was reported how after tracker dogs led the authorities 
to the village, a villager was hospitalized after falling off a cliff, while soldiers 
shot dead one man and wounded another. The authorities then sealed the 
village, forbidding villagers to leave without a permit and requiring all males 
to report every evening to the police. The village was also forced to pay for a 
twenty-man police post.36 More graphic accounts of what happened in Silwan 
are to be found in the private papers of soldiers present at the scene. A North 
Staffordshire Regiment officer recorded in his diary that Black Watch men beat 
twelve Arabs to death in Silwan with rifle butts.37 The assailants had appar-
ently left the two dead soldiers face down with their kilts raised and buttocks 
exposed, further enraging their comrades: “An insult the local Arabs suffered 
for.”38 Another British officer recalled that the “Jocks” (slang for the Scottish) 
were uncontrollable after their comrades’ deaths and so the high command 
gave them eight hours to “search” Silwan without rifles: “a lot of Arabs were 
very sorry that it had happened.”39
Arab sources also provide information about the conduct of soldiers. For 
example, in June 1936, Muslim religious leaders wrote to the high commissioner 
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detailing how police officers on operations “stamped” on things, “smashed 
doors, mirrors, tables, chairs, wardrobes, glass, porcelain,” and ripped women’s 
clothing and bed linen. Soldiers mixed in margarine and oil with foodstuffs, 
trampled on “holy books,” and destroyed wooden kitchen utensils as well as 
glasses, clocks, smoking pipes, and basins.40 That same month, the Arab Higher 
Committee, the Palestinians’ supreme leadership, protested to the high com-
missioner about police and soldiers hitting innocent people; insulting their 
dignity; stealing items; and destroying furniture, goods, and provisions.41 Bahjat 
Abu Gharbiyah, a Palestinian rebel, gunman, and journalist during the revolt, 
wrote in his memoirs how servicemen “searched houses, each one by itself, in 
a way that was sabotaging on purpose”:
[T]hey looted some of the assets of the houses, and burnt 
some other houses, and destroyed provisions/goods. After put-
ting flour, wheat, rice, sugar and others together, they added 
all the olive oil or petrol they could find. And in every search 
operation they destroyed a number of houses of the village 
and damaged others. They also put signs on other houses to 
destroy them in the future if there are any incidents near 
the village, even if that incident is only cutting telephone 
wires.42
Arab villagers were trapped between the hammer of rebel operations and 
the anvil of British forces.43 In one typical example, when the police went 
to investigate a report that rebels had blocked the road near the village of 
Shafa ‘Amr with trenches and roadblocks, the “local inhabitants protested that 
they had been compelled to do this sabotage by rebel gangs, but this excuse 
did not spare them from a fine of £[P]700 [Palestine pounds],” and they had 
to repair the road.44 The collective fines imposed were a heavy burden for 
Palestinian villagers, especially when the authorities also took away all their 
livestock, smashed up properties, imposed long curfews, set up police posts, 
blew up houses, and detained some or all of the menfolk in distant deten-
tion camps. Fines varied but could be as high as £P5,000 and they had to be 
paid promptly in cash or in the form of produce such as animals, eggs, and 
cereals.45 To make matters worse, the rebels also fined or robbed villages for 
not supporting the revolt, £P1,000 in one case, £P10–100 per household in 
another.46 To give a sense of the magnitude of the fines, in the late 1930s a 
British police officer of constable rank earned a basic pay of £P11 per month 
rising to £P18 for an assistant inspector “all found,” a wage that drew police 
recruits to Palestine. By contrast, Rosemary Sayigh has estimated the average 
yearly wage of a Palestinian rural family at between £P25–30.47 In the village 
of al-Tira (or Taybeh; the transliteration from Arabic to Hebrew to English is 
not clear), peasants responded to a fine of £P2,000 by picking up what they 
could carry and leaving.48
If villagers were unable to pay collective fines in currency, they paid in 
produce: “As usual police were called to do the dirty work, collecting chickens, 
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eggs and grain from each family and taking them to Haifa for sale.”49 Police 
activity often went beyond the forced requisitioning of produce, as when 
the police went to a village after rebels had killed some “wogs” and promptly 
indulged in indiscriminate violence against the villagers rather than the rebels. 
“By the time we arrived of course they had vanished into the blue but we had 
orders to decimate the whole place which we did, all animals and grain and 
food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten up with rifle 
butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their [sic] I should imagine.”50 
Villagers were in permanent debt as their mukhtars (headmen) attempted to 
gather official fines from their penniless and hungry villagers. Certain villagers 
were also required to produce bonds of up to £P100 and additional sureties to 
ensure their good behavior. Failure to pay could result in imprisonment.51
The British ratcheted up their punitive actions, especially after September 
1937. When on 18 February 1938 rebels ambushed a car twelve miles south 
of Haifa, killing an RAF officer and badly wounding a British woman passenger 
near the “bad” village of Ijzim (“good” and “bad” villages are recurring terms in 
British files), the authorities brought in a tracker dog to pick up the scent:
The trail was expected to lead up the Wadi Mughar to the 
bad village of Igzim [Ijzim in literary Arabic], and B Company, 
less one platoon, under Major Clay was detailed as dog escort. 
The fourth platoon was given the task of rounding up 2,300 
goats and 200 sheep for confiscation as a punishment on the 
inhabitants of the area in which the crime was committed. 
The dog quickly took up the trail and moved up the Wadi 
Mughar to Igzim, where it “marked” a house on the northern 
end of the village. It was then taken back to the coast road 
and put onto another clue, again tracking back to the same 
village, but to a house opposite the first one. When searched, 
however, the owners of both houses were absent. The whole 
village was then cordoned and searched, while reports were 
sent to Brigade Headquarters in Haifa on the result of the 
dog’s tracking. Later in the morning orders were received to 
demolish the two houses marked by the dogs.52
A policeman present at Ijzim, Sydney Burr, wrote to his parents about the 
brutality of the “search,” which was so harsh as to prompt a complaint about 
army behavior from the Anglican Mission in Palestine.53
The use of Doberman tracker dogs, specially imported from South Africa, 
gave a spurious exactitude to an operational method that relied on villagers 
doing the work of the British army, suppressing the rebels on pain of the col-
lective punishment and reprisals that would inevitably ensue if there were any 
rebel actions in the area. Critics alleged that tracker dogs always picked out 
some suspect on parade; on one occasion after a robbery, the dog followed 
a scent to a distant village, leading the police to an old blind man and then 
barked at him, “proving” that he was the robber.54 Once the tracker dog had 
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marked a Palestinian or a dwelling, the police invariably “found” some bullets 
to confirm guilt and the courts then took over, with hanging the ultimate pen-
alty for the possession of even one round.
unoFFiciaL acts oF vioLence
Excepting the endemic problem of soldiers stealing and taking “souvenirs” 
during searches—which even periodic personal searches of men by noncom-
missioned officers under officers’ orders failed to stop—the actions described 
in the previous section were within the law and (generally) acceptable under 
British military rule.55 They formed part of the official policies designed to 
break the resolve of the Palestinian peasantry. But there were also unofficial 
acts of brutality committed by rank-and-file servicemen that were not permit-
ted, stretching beyond “official” collective punishment and fines to include 
much more violent acts directed not only at property but also at individuals. 
While these ad hoc outrages were often soldiers’ revenge against rebel attacks, 
they also had the unintended effect of helping the suppression of the revolt by 
further terrorizing ordinary Palestinian civilians (and rebel fighters). Officers 
operating in the field seem to have accepted or even sanctioned a level of casual 
brutality by their men. Some level of personal pleasure in causing suffering also 
played its part. As the commanding officer of the Essex Regiment—a unit that 
acted very brutally in Ireland in the early 1920s—noted at the end of 1937, puni-
tive search operations against Arab villages were “enjoyed by all ranks.”56
A common unofficial British army practice was to make local Arabs ride 
with military convoys to prevent mine attacks. Soldiers carried them or tied 
them to the bonnets of lorries or put the hostages on small flatbeds at the 
front of trains, all to prevent mining or sniper attacks. “The naughty boys who 
we had in the cages in these camps” were put in vehicles in front of the 
convoy for the “deterrent effect,” as one British officer put it.57 The army told 
the Arabs that they would shoot anyone who tried to run away.58 Soldiers 
would brake hard at the end of a journey and then casually drive over the Arab 
who had tumbled from the bonnet, killing or maiming him. As Arthur Lane, a 
Manchester Regiment private, later candidly recalled in an oral interview:
[W]hen you’d finished your duty you would come away noth-
ing had happened no bombs or anything and the driver would 
switch his wheel back and to make the truck waver and the 
poor wog on the front would roll off into the deck. Well if he 
was lucky he’d get away with a broken leg but if he was unlucky 
the truck behind coming up behind would hit him. But nobody 
bothered to pick up the bits they were left. You know we were 
there we were the masters we were the bosses and whatever we 
did was right. . . . Well you know you don’t want him anymore. 
He’s fulfilled his job. And that’s when Bill Usher [the command-
ing officer] said that it had to stop because before long they’d 
be running out of bloody rebels to sit on the bonnet.59
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British troops also left Arabs wounded on the battlefield to die60 and mal-
treated Arab fighters taken in battle, so much so that the rebels tried to remove 
their wounded or dead from the field of battle.61 Lane, the soldier with the 
Manchester Regiment, was in a clash with guerrillas in which several British 
soldiers had been killed and he provides a graphic, disturbing account of what 
happened to the Arabs captured after a firefight who were taken back to the 
military camp and tied to a post:
[T]hey were in a state and they were really knocked about. . . . 
whoever had done it when they got them on the wagons to 
bring them back to camp the lads had beat them up, set about 
them . . . [the interviewer asks him with what] . . .  Anything. 
Anything they could find. Rifle butts, bayonets, scabbard bayo-
nets, fists, boots, whatever. There was one poor sod there he 
was I would imagine my age actually and I’d heard people 
say in the past that you could take your eye out and have it 
cleaned and put it back and I always believed it but it’s not 
so because this lad’s eye was hanging down on his lip, on his 
cheek. The whole eye had been knocked out and it was hang-
ing down and there was blood dripping on his face.
When asked why the soldiers had done this, Lane replied simply, “Same as any 
soldier. I don’t care whether he’s English, German, Japanese or what. He’s the 
victor he’s the boss and you accept the treatment that he gives you. I don’t 
care what you say. . . . There’s a beast in every man I don’t care who he is. You 
can say the biggest queen or queer that you come across but there’s a beast in 
him somewhere and in a situation like that it comes out.”62
These excesses were soldiers’ responses to rebels wounding or killing com-
rades in battles, with prisoners or local villagers being convenient targets for 
revenge attacks.63 British soldiers also bayoneted innocent Arabs64 and gunned 
down Arab fighters en masse as they came out to surrender near Jenin:
At one time the Ulsters and West Kents caught about 60 of 
them [Arab guerrillas] in a valley and as they walked out 
with their arms up mowed them down with machine guns. 
I inspected them afterwards and most of them were boys 
between 16 and 20 from Syria. . . . No news of course is given 
to the newspapers, so what you read in the papers is just 
enough to allay public uneasiness in England.65
There is also the question of the methods used by Orde Wingate’s “Special 
Night Squads” that mixed British servicemen with Jewish fighters and pitted 
them against the Arabs in Galilee—“extreme and cruel” noted one colonial 
official, Hugh Foot, a force that tortured, whipped, executed, and abused Arabs 
according to Jewish sources.66
The brutality of the Palestine police and prison service had some official 
sanction. Frances Newton, a British resident of Haifa sympathetic to the Arabs 
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(and eventually banned from the country), noted that after the murder of 
the assistant district commissioner Lewis Andrews in September 1937 by 
Arab gunmen, the police asked permission to use torture to extract informa-
tion from suspects, which the Colonial Office granted. “Several of the leading 
police officers in Jerusalem refused to countenance it. One of them has since 
left the country.”67
Tegart, the senior officer mentioned above, who had been brought in to 
Palestine from the India police, established torture centers, known euphemis-
tically as “Arab Investigation Centers,” where suspects got the “third degree” 
until they “spilled the beans.” A major such center in a Jewish quarter of West 
Jerusalem was closed only after colonial officials including District Commissioner 
Edward Keith-Roach complained to the high commissioner.68 The British army 
divisional commander in Palestine, Sir Richard O’Connor, also wrote of the use 
of the “third degree” and “black and tan methods” (oft-used phrases), the latter 
a reference to the British paramilitary unit known as the “Black and Tans” that 
operated against Irish rebels in Ireland’s war of independence.69 In an interview 
with this author, Abu Gharbiyah stated that torture ended only after the issue 
was discussed in Britain’s Parliament.70 Interrogators used the “waterboarding” 
torture at these centers.71 Keith-Roach raised the issue that the “questionable 
practises” carried out by Criminal Investigation Department officers on suspects 
were counterproductive, both in terms of the information gathered and the 
effect that they had on local people’s confidence in the police.72
Accounts in both Arabic and English also detail torture—of Arabs being 
blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in which the British 
had placed mines; of British operatives placing “terrorist” bombs in Haifa; of 
detainees being left in open cages in the sun without sustenance; of men 
being beaten with wet ropes, “boxed,” and having their teeth smashed; and 
of men having their feet burnt with oil.73 Those who were “boxed” were 
beaten until knocked unconscious, “needles” were 
used on suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, 
and British and Jewish auxiliary forces maltreated 
Arabs by having them hold heavy stones and then 
beating them when they dropped them. Guards also 
used bayonets on sleep-deprived men and made them 
wear bells around their necks and then dance.74 Arab 
detainees in Palestine’s prisons protested the extreme treatment meted out 
by guards in petitions made through the Anglican Mission. Prisoners jumped 
to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had their testicles 
tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood studded with nails, had 
wire tightened around their big toes, and hair was torn from their faces and 
heads. Special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red-hot skew-
ers were used on detainees, prisoners were sodomized, and boiling oil was 
used on them, as were intoxicants (morphine, cocaine, and heroin). There 
were also electric shocks, water funneled into suspects’ stomachs, and mock 
executions.75
Guards used bayonets 
on sleep-deprived Arab 
detainees and made them 
wear bells around their 
necks and then dance.
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At least two outrages by British forces in Palestine meet the dictionary defi-
nition of an atrocity and suggest an “official” military operational method of 
destruction that could get out of hand and descend into “unofficial” violence. 
These two incidents, for which there is enough evidence to permit a reason-
ably full reconstruction, occurred at al-Bassa, a village in Acre district near the 
Lebanese border, in September 1938, and at Halhul, a village near Hebron, in 
May 1939.76 In the case of al-Bassa, soldiers retaliated against the village after 
four of their comrades were killed in its vicinity by a rebel land mine. The 
logic was that when Arab insurgents laid a mine they informed nearby vil-
lages of its placement, making the local villagers responsible. In fact, a policy 
of retaliation in such cases fitted in with the collective responsibility detailed 
above and at the same time discouraged further rebel attacks. Within twenty-
four hours, al-Bassa was burned to the ground and at least twenty villagers 
were herded onto a bus that was forced to drive over a land mine buried by 
the soldiers, after which other villagers were forced to dig a pit and bury the 
bodies.77 As for Halhul—one of the villages designated as “bad” by the British 
for its rebel sympathies—the brutal treatment meted out was the result of the 
army’s attempt to extract intelligence from the villagers on the whereabouts 
of weapons caches. While brutality was not uncommon in attempts to obtain 
information, in this case some fifteen elderly male villagers—all of whom had 
been herded into cages and left out in the open in intense heat for days with 
inadequate water—died of thirst and exposure. Halhul and al-Bassa were not 
isolated incidents. The Anglican Mission in Jerusalem listed twenty-two villages 
and towns in which troops inflicted single or multiple outrages, sometimes 
over a period of months.78
concLusion
In surveying British military law and operational methods in Palestine in 
the late 1930s, it is clear that embedded in the official “system” of repression 
was a targeting of Palestinian civilians that was brutal and could lead to atroci-
ties. It is not clear which came first: the (often) brutal operational methods or 
the laws and collective ideas, traditions, and norms that validated them—not 
surprising when one considers the traditional British preference for flexible 
practice over codified theory.
Troops in Palestine used force across a spectrum: not so much minimum 
force as necessary force and, at times, excessive force, which itself was often 
“necessary” to secure Britain’s objective of defeating the rebels by targeting 
their civilian support base. That said, the Colonial Office, the high commis-
sioner, and civilian sensibilities generally helped to establish “red lines” that the 
security forces could not cross. Moreover, the humanist tendencies of some 
servicemen countered the hawkishness of others. The army was pulled in 
different directions, being asked to repress the Palestinians quickly to free up 
forces for a possible war in Europe, but without too much “frightfulness.” The 
British high command tolerated the less blatant abuses committed by its men 
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in the field, but senior officers based in Haifa and Jerusalem were sensitive to 
charges of abuse, politically if not morally, and so it was junior officers in the 
field who were intimately involved in any excesses. The Anglican bishop in 
Jerusalem put it succinctly, writing how outrages “are not officially sanctioned 
although they have not been officially regretted.”79 The result was a tension 
between violence and moderation in the British system; the police and army 
behaved differently, and many officials opposed the violence.
Given these competing and conflicting demands, British officers compared 
their position unfavorably to other European countries that were much harsher 
in suppressing colonial revolts. General Wavell, the senior British military com-
mander in Palestine at the time, remarked to a colleague, “If the Germans were 
in occupation in Haifa we’d not have any bloody trouble from the Arabs.”80 In 
some comparative sense, Wavell was right, though such a perspective smacks 
of an apology for the military power on which empires depend.
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